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Speaking up for Others : 
Locus Standi and Representative Bodies 
Peter BOWAL* 
Dans le présent article, l'auteur analyse le problème de la qualité pour 
agir d'une association, par exemple, une organisation syndicale, afin de 
plaider devant les tribunaux une question de droit public au nom d'un ou de 
plusieurs de ses membres. Après une revue de lajurisprudence canadienne 
sur ce sujet, l'auteur constate que l'accès aux tribunaux devient deplus en 
plus restrictif et que le succès d'une telle entreprise dépend d'un certain 
nombre de facteurs, y compris la charge de travail du tribunal saisi. 
This article addresses the issue of whether a representative body such 
as a trade association would, in the ordinary course, enjoy standing to 
present a public law question to the court on behalf of one or more of its 
members where there is no more compelling demand for representative 
advocacy other than the interests of convenience or public relations. 
The author canvasses recent case law in Canada and concludes that it 
tends to a marked restriction in public interest access to the courts. The 
success in obtaining standing would depend on a number of factors includ-
ing the manner of conduct of the litigation, the political nature of the 
subject matter and, increasingly, the workload of the court. 
* Associate Professor (Business Law), Faculty of Management, University of Calgary. 
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Congress can constitutionally enact a statuee con-
ferring on any non-official person, or on a desig-
nated group of non-official persons, authortty to 
bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in viola-
tion of his statutory powers ; for then, in like man-
ner, there is an actual controversy, and there is 
nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from 
empowering any person, official or not, to institute 
a proceeding involving such a controversy, even if 
the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. 
Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, pri-
vate Attorney Generals1. 
Locus standi, or standing, is a common law construct designed, in the 
public interest, to regulate the flow of litigation in both the private and 
1. Justice Jerome N . Frank in Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 at 704 (2d Cir. 
1943). 
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public law domains2. « No interest, no action » is the maxim3. It recognizes 
that judicial resources are limited and that certain persons are more inter-
ested in the outcome of the lis than other persons4. Canadian courts are 
most drawn to the model case which has a «clear, concrete, factual 
background upon which the decision of the court could be based5 ». Ac-
cordingly, these interested persons only, if anyone, should have carriage of 
the matter in court6. 
2. Mr. Justice Cory expressed the substantive and logistical strains that public law standing 
puts on the judicial system, in Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 ; (1992) 88 D.L.R. (4th) 193 ; 132 
N.R. 241 (cited to D.L.R.) (hereinafter Canadian Council ofChurchs), at 201-202 : « One 
great advantage of operating in the traditional [private law] mode is that the courts can 
reach their decisions based on facts that have been clearly established. It was by acting 
in this manner that the courts established the rule of law and provided a peaceful means 
of resolving disputes. Operating primarily, if not almost exclusively, in the traditional 
manner courts in most regions operate to capacity. Courts play an important role in our 
society. If they are to continue to do so care must be taken to ensure that judicial 
resources are not overextended. This is a factor that will always have to be placed in the 
balance when consideration is given to extending standing. » See, generally, J. TOKAR, 
« Administrative Law : Locus Standi in Judicial Review Proceedings », (1985) 14 Man. 
L.R. 209 ; W. BOGART, « The Lessons of Liberalized Standing », (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall 
L.J. 195. 
3. The concept is also found in Civil Law systems. See, H. SOLUS and R. PERROT, Droit 
judiciaire privé, vol. 1, Paris, Sirey, 1961, at para. 223 : « pas d'intérêt, pas d'action ». In 
Quebec, the private law standard is « sufficient interest ». See, article 55 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure of Quebec, L.R.Q., c. C-25: «55. Whoever brings an action at law, 
whether for the enforcement of a right which is not recognized, jeopardized or denied, or 
otherwise to obtain a pronouncement upon the existence of a legal situation, must have a 
sufficient interest therein. » Although this article is primarily concerned with standing of 
representative bodies as plaintiffs or applicants, one notes that with the arrival of the 
new Code civil du Québec in 1994, « associations » may both sue and be sued in their 
collective capacity. The applicable provisions are Articles 2267 to 2279 of the Code civil. 
Article 2271 reads : «Art. 2271. The directors may sue and be sued to assert the rights 
and interests of the association. » See, also, article 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
4. In Thorsonv. Attorney General ofCanada(No. 2), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 ; ;1974] 43 D.L.R. 
(3d) 1 (cited to D.L.R.) (hereinafter Thorson), where the plaintiff could show no special 
damage or prejudice above any other taxpayer in Canada, the trial judge explained his 
« floodgates » concern (22 D.L.R. (3d) 274) at p. 278 : « If every taxpayer could bring an 
action to test the validity of a statute that involved the expenditure of public money, it 
would in my view lead to grave inconvenience and public disorder [emphasis added]. » 
5. Canadian Council of Churches, supra, note 2, per Cory J. at 206. 
6. In the United States, Justice Brennan early implied that standing was given to benefit the 
deliberations of the court. He wrote inBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) at 204: «Have 
the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to 
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which 
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions ? This is 
the gist of the question of standing. » 
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The matter of standing of private parties to take public law issues to 
court is more complex than the issue of private law standing, which by 
contrast is conceptually self-regulating7. By definition, administrative or 
constitutional law issues affect the public interest or the collective interest 
of a large number of persons. The conduct of an administrative tribunal or 
the constitutionality of legislation, moreover, are not obviously affairs 
which, by their nature, are readily disposed to private inter partes set-
tlement or resolution. 
Who is so specifically and amply interested, not to mention financially 
robust, to bring the question to court, since these cases are only rarely 
referred8 by governments themselves for judicial vetting ? This article 
reviews the very generous common law9 indulgence of Canadian courts 
within the last twenty years to hear and adjudicate these cases, even when 
brought by individuals with little more than ideological or general commu-
7. One should not confuse the concept of public law standing with an application for the 
more limited intervenor status, which many representative bodies might also wish to 
make in appropriate circumstances. In the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Can-
adian Council of Churches, supra, note 2, Cory J. described the parallel interests in 
balance, at 207 : « Yet the views of the public litigant who cannot obtain standing need 
not be lost. Public interest organizations are, as they should be, frequently granted 
intervener status. The views and submissions of interveners on issues of public impor-
tance frequently provide great assistance to the courts. Yet that assistance is given 
against a background of established facts and in a time frame and context that is 
controlled by the courts. A proper balance between providing for the submissions of 
public interest groups and preserving judicial resources is maintained. » This passage 
was expressly approved in Rudolph v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, (1992) 
139 N.R. 233 at 235, which allowed the League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith 
intervenor status in an immigration case. 
8. Pursuant to the Judicature statutes in each jurisdiction. 
9. The distinction drawn here is judge-made rules versus statutory parameters for standing. 
This article will analyze only the former category. With respect to the latter class, 
statutorily-derived standing, it is clear that legislatures are today more active in promul-
gating permissive criteria for standing, particularly for environmental and planning 
decisions. Consider, eg. the expansive rights of appeal for «any person who considers 
himself aggrieved » (emphasis added). Even in that case, the court will not read such 
standing as entirely subjective and open-ended. It will interpret the section to apply to 
« any person who reasonably considers himself aggrieved » (emphasis added) : Friends 
of Toronto Parkland v. Toronto (City), (1991) 6 O.R. (3d) 196 (Div. Ct.). 
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nity interest10. It is submitted that this liberal policy on public law standing 
was grounded on the absence of a coherent theoretical framework, a desire 
not to bury facially-significant public law questions in threshold tech-
nicalities of standing and ajudicial acceptance, or resignation, of the role of 
courts to «hear and decide» such questions as they arise11. However, 
stung by mounting backlogs, Canadian courts are closing the doors on 
public interest standing. 
Despite the retreat, persons with common economic, social or po-
litical interests continue to assemble for power in collectives to better 
facilitate the vindication of their common interests. These representative 
bodies, often separate legal entities, charged with the responsibility of 
serving the various interests of their memberships, will often find them-
selves in a position to bring a public law issue to court on behalf of their 
members. 
This article considers whether representative bodies constituted to 
protect the interests of their members in any economic or socio-political 
sector can per se assert standing where those interests of their members are 
affected. An example might be a case where a certain sector, such as liquor 
10. Solicitor and client costs are even awarded occasionally to the representative body. See, 
Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 2 
W.W.R. 193 (S.C.C.), where La Forest J. at 250 did so «given the society's circum-
stances ». But, cf. the dissent by Stevenson J. on the matter, at 256 : « I see no 
justification for awarding the respondent society costs on a solicitor-and-client basis. 
The general rule in this court is that a successful party recovers costs on the usual party-
and-party basis. That was the rule applied by the courts below. My colleague [La Forest 
J.] proposes an award of solicitor-and-client costs extending to the courts below. I see no 
ground for our suggesting they were in error, and I see no ground for our departing from 
our own general rule. Public interest groups must be prepared to abide by the same 
principles as apply to other litigants. Were we to produce special rules for such litigants, 
we would jeopardize an important principle : those undertaking litigation must be 
prepared to accept some responsibility for the costs. I see nothing here to justify calling 
upon the taxpayers to meet the solicitor-and-client costs of this party. » 
11. The Honourable Madam Justice Beverley McLachlin, in « The Role of Judges in Modern 
Society », prepared for the 10th Commonwealth Law Conference in Nicosia, Cyprus, 
May, 1993, reprinted in THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SOCIETY OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA, Administrative Law, Vancouver, 1994, pointed to the increasingly-impor-
tant role of the courts as independent arbiter between governments and governed and 
the task of judicial law-making within that realm. She writes at p. 1.1.03 : «Resolving 
disputes is still the primary and most fundamental task of the judiciary. But for some 
time now, it has been recognized that the matter is not so simple. In the course of 
resolving disputes, common-law judges interpreted and inevitably, incrementally, with 
the aid of the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis, changed the law. The common-law 
thus came to recognize that while dispute resolution was a primary task of the judge, the 
judge played a secondary role of law-maker, or at least, law-developer. » 
910 Les Cahiers de Droit (1994) 35 C. de D. 905 
outlet licensees or expropriated landowners, are of the view that the 
tribunal which adjudicates their interests is biased, or that the governing 
legislation is unconstitutional. Each member ofthat group regulated by the 
legislation and the tribunal's authority would clearly have standing to 
challenge the legislation and tribunal. Nevertheless, each member may 
choose not to do so for a variety of reasons. These reasons include, but are 
not limited to, the expense, time and the unwelcome negative public 
relations occasioned by litigation. The last reason may be particularly 
germane at a practical level if that member has an ongoing relationship with 
the same regulators. The member's association, on the other hand, may 
have the resources, and indeed a private mandate of a contractual nature, 
to address such an issue. Moreover, as an entity, it would not be con-
strained by any direct relationship with the regulator or other third party. 
The history of public law standing in Canada is outlined. It has been an 
evolution from rigid narrow rules to a broad and flexible approach and, 
more recently, back to restraint12. The legal criteria for standing generally 
are now described with a view to formulating a proposition about the status 
of representative bodies to challenge public law processes. This article 
concludes that the present law is in transition. Standing will depend upon 
ripeness of the issue, the extent of factual presentation and other for-
malities. 
1. Origins and Legal Basis of Standing 
Historically, only the Attorney-General enjoyed standing to question 
a public right. The Attorney-General could bring an action by his or her 
own motion or on behalf of a citizen who expressed a concern. The 
Attorney-General had unfettered discretion to take up a challenge or de-
cline to do so. The private party therefore lacked control to bring a public 
issue before the court. In Ware v. Regent's Canal Co., Chelmsford, L.C. 
stated13 : 
Where there has been an excess of the powers given by an Act of Parliament, but 
no injury has been occasioned to any individual, oris imminent and of irreparable 
consequences, I apprehend that no one but the Attorney-General on behalf of the 
12. For a review and history of standing see T.A. CROMWELL, LOCUS Standi : A Commen-
tary on the Law of Standing in Canada, Toronto, Carswell, 1986 ; and the ONTARIO LAW 
REFORM COMMISSION , Report on the Law of Standing, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 1989. Many scholars view these two works as the most definitive exposés of the 
subject in Canada. 
13. Ware v. Regent's Canal Co., (1858) 3 De G. & J. 212, at 228. See also : St. Lawrence 
Rendering Co. v. Cornwall, [1951] O.R. 669 (H.C.J.) ; Cowan v. CanadianBroadcasting 
Corporation, (1966) 56 D.L.R. (2d) 578 (Ont. C.A.) (hereinafter Cowan). 
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public has a right to apply to this Court to check the exorbitance of the party in the 
exercise of the powers confided to him by the Legislature. 
InBoyce v. Paddington Borough Council14, an exception was quarried 
from the harshness of this rule. Now a plaintiff would be allowed to sue 
without joining the Attorney-General. Buckley J. summarized: 
A plaintiff can sue without joining the Attorney General in two cases : first, where 
the interference with the public right is such that some private right of his is at the 
same time interfered with [...] and, secondly, where no private right is interfered 
with, but the plaintiff, in respect of his public right, suffers special damage peculiar 
to himself from the interference with the public right13. 
These Boyce exceptions were adopted in Canada rather recently and 
now form the first criterion of a three step test to establish standing16. In 
Cowan v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.11', Schroeder J.A. described this 
direct interest requirement in the following terms : 
A plaintiff, in attempting to restrain, control or confine with proper limits, the act 
of a public or quasi-public body which affects the public generally, is an outsider 
unless he has sustained special damage or can show that he has some special 
interest, private interest, or sufficient interest18. 
2. Contours of the Canadian Law of Standing 
2.1 The Supreme Court of Canada Trilogy 
Canadian rules of standing have their origins in a trilogy of Supreme 
Court of Canada cases : Thorson v. A.- G. Canada (No. 2)19, Nova Scotia 
Board of Censors v. McNeil20 and Minister of Justice of Canada v. Borow-
ski21 . A summary of each case is necessary to understand how standing has 
14. Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council, [1903] 1 Ch. 109 (hereinafter Boyce). 
15. Id., at 114. 
16. See Rosenberg v. Grand River Conservation Authority, (1976) 69 D.L.R. (3d) 384 (Ont. 
CA.). Leave to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused on Oct. 19, 1976. 
17. Cowan, supra, note 13. 
18. Id., at 580 (emphasis added). See, also, Smith v. A.-G. Ont., [1924] 3 D.L.R. 189, 42 
C.C.C. 215, [1924] S.C.R. 331 (hereinafter Smith). Duff J. stated at 193-194 (D.L.R.) : 
« An individual, for example, has no status to maintain an action restraining a wrongful 
violation of a public right unless he is exceptionally prejudiced by the wrongful act 
[emphasis added]. » See Thorson, infra, note 19, where Judson J. at 4 aptly summarized 
the tests in Canada : « The ratio of the judgments [[..] is that an individual has no status to 
challenge the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament unless he is specially 
affected or exceptionally prejudiced by it [emphasis added]. » 
19. Thorson, supra, note 4. 
20. Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265 ; ;1975) 55 D.L.R. .3d) )32 
(cited to D.L.R.) (hereinafter McNeil). 
21. Minister of Justice of Canada c. Borowski, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575 ; 130 D.L.R. (3d) 588 
(cited to D.L.R.) (hereinafter Borowski). 
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devolved from the Attorney-General to a party who can display a « genuine 
interest » in the substance of the public concern. 
Thorson 
Thorson brought an action seeking a declaration that the Official 
Languages Act22 and certain appropriation statutes providing money to 
implement the Official Languages Act were ultra vires the Parliament of 
Canada. The Attorney-General refused to act on behalf of Thorson, so he 
brought the action in his own name. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the plaintiff had locus standi, 
notwithstanding that the interest claimed was nothing more than that of a 
mere taxpayer. While Thorson was not directly or personally affected, he 
was, in the Court's discretion, an interested party. Due to the declaratory 
nature of the Act, there was no person or class of persons who were directly 
affected and who could challenge its constitutionality. Laskin J., as he then 
was, speaking for the majority, in granting standing, noted that23 : 
[...] it would be strange and, indeed, alarming, if there was no way in which a 
question of alleged excess of legislative power, a matter traditionally within the 
scope of the judicial process, could be made the subject of adjudication. 
McNeil 
After the film Last Tango in Paris was banned by the Nova Scotia 
Censorship Board, the editor of a newspaper sought a declaration that the 
Theatres and Amusemenss Act24, which created the Board, was ultra vires 
the province. Citing its own rationale in Thorson, the Court held that the 
plaintiff had standing even though he was no more affected by the ban than 
any other member of the public. Laskin, C.J.C. concluded25 : 
The challenged legislation does not appear to me to be legislation directed only to 
the regulation of operators and film distributors. It strikes at the members of the 
public in one of its central aspects. 
In my view, this is enough, in the light of the fact that there appears to be no other 
way, practically speaking, to subject the challenged Act to judicial review, to 
support the claim of the respondent to have the discretion of the Court exercised in 
his favour to give him standing. 
22. Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-2. 
23. Thorson, supra, note 4 at 7. For commentary on this case, see : R. JOHNSON, «LOCUS 
Standi in Constitutional Cases after Thorson », (1975) P.L. 137 ; J. STANLEY, «Thorson 
v. A.G. Canada», (1974) 23 U.N.B.L.J. 102. 
24. Theatres and Amusements Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 304. 
25. McNeil, supra, note 20 at 637. 
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The Court had, in fact, recognized that the businesses specifically 
regulated by the Act were more directly affected but nonetheless decided 
to award standing to a member of the public26. Thus, this decision repre-
sented a further relaxation of standing constraints. Certain laws, in their 
general application to all subjects in the jurisdiction, « directly affected » 
them and, although the effect was not necessarily acute, standing to as 
conferred. Nevertheless, the complainant still had to demonstrate some 
nexus between his or her own freedom and the impugned government 
action. 
Borowski 
Borowski, a male person, challenged the validity of the abortion 
provision in the Criminal Code of Canada27. The Supreme Court of Can-
ada, citing both Thorson and McNeil as authorities, again granted standing. 
Martland J. set out the three-point standard which is now often referred to 
as definitive28 : 
I interpret these cases as deciding that to establish status as a plaintiff in a suit 
seeking a declaration that legislation is invalid, if there is a serious issue as to its 
invalidity, a person need only to show that he is affected by it directly or that he 
has a genuine interest as a citizen in the validity of the legislation and that there is 
no other reasonable and effective manner in which the issue may be brought 
before the Court. 
It is implicit that « personal interest » can be one constituent of a 
« genuine interest ».Borowski, however, also showed that an interest could 
be «genuine» (and standing would lie), even if it was not essentially 
« personal ». If a party can prove either of these interests exist, then a court 
can grant that party standing to bring forward a purely public matter29. 
Two other requisite criteria, namely a « serious issue as to invalidity » 
and « no other reasonable and effective manner in which the issue may be 
26. See also: D. MULLAN, «Standing after McNeil», (1976) 8 Ottawa L. Rev. 32; K. 
SWARTZENBERGER, «Comment», (1982) 20Alta. L. Rev. 503 ; D. HASKETT, «Locus 
Standi and the Public Interest », (1981) 4 Can.-U.S. L.J. 39. 
27. CriminalCode of Canada, R.S.C. 1970, c. 34, s. 251 (4), (5), and (6), as am. by S.C. 1974-
75-76, c. 93, s. 22.1. 
28. Borowski, supra, note 21 at 606 (emphasis added). 
29. For commentary generally on the Borowski case, see F. BOGART, « Developments in the 
Canadian Law of Standing», (1984) 3 Civ. Just. Q. 339; H. KUSHNER, «Comment», 
(1983) 17 U.B.C.L. Rev. 143 ; D. MULLAN, « Developments in Administrative Law-The 
1981-82 Term », (1983) 5 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 10. Another example of standing in one's 
capacity qua citizen is Energy Probe v. Canada (Attorney General), (1989) 3 C.E.L.R. 
(N.S.) 262,58 D.L.R. (4th) 515 (Ont. CA.), leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada 
refused (1989) 102 N.R. 399n (S.C.C.), at 530-531 (D.L.R.). 
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brought before the Court » are thresholds to the main consideration of 
standing30. It is still believed that in Borowski « no party directly affected 
could reasonably be expected to challenge the legislation31 », but Laskin, 
C.J.C. in his dissent pointed out several32. 
2.2 Application to Administrative Decisions 
These trilogy guidelines for public interest standing originated from 
actions where the constitutionality of legislation was at issue33. The Court 
did not address whether the same approach would apply to a non-con-
stitutional challenge to the statutory authority for administrative action. 
30. Borowski may be considered the « high water mark » in the Canadian law of public 
standing. Most other jurisdictions impose greater constraints. For example, in Australia 
the leading case on the issue is Australian Conservation Foundation Inc. v. Common-
wealth of Australia, (1980) 28 A.L.R. 257 (H.C.), where Gibbs J. described the restric-
tion on private recourse at 270 : « A belief, however strongly felt, that the law generally, 
or a particular law, should be observed, or that conduct of a particular kind should be 
prevented, does not suffice to give its possessor locus standi. If that were not so, the rule 
requiring special interest would be meaningless. Any plaintiff who felt strongly enough 
to bring an action could maintain it. » 
31. Per Major J. in Hy and Zel's Inc. etal. v. Ontario (Attorney-General), and Paul Magder 
Furs Ltd. et al. v. Ontario (Attorney-General), (1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 634 (S.C.C.) 
(hereinafter Hy and Zei's and Magder), at 662. 
32. Borowski, supra, note 21 at 596-597. As we see, Laskin C.J.C, as he then was, foresaw 
the retreat from the majority's expansive approach that we are now witnessing. He 
distinguished Borowski from McNeil and Thorson on the basis that the legislative 
enactments impugned in the latter two cases were of a « character » that warranted 
standing whereas the legislation in Borowski did not (at 595-596). See, contra, for an 
interesting analysis : M. PICKARD, « Why Joseph Borowsky Has Standing », (1986) 36 
U.T.L.J. 19. 
33. As for the United States, Justice Earl Warren stated the test in vague and confusing 
terms in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) at 102-103 : « The nexus demanded of federal 
taxpayers [in order to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal spend-
ing] has two aspects to it. First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that 
status and the type of legislative enactment attacked [...] Secondly, the taxpayer must 
establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional 
infringement alleged [...] When both nexuses are established, the litigant will have 
shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the controversy and will be a proper and 
appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction. » It was not until relatively 
recently that the United States Supreme Court set out specific tests on public standing, 
derived directly from Article III of the Constitution of the United States. The case is 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 102 S. Ct. 752, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1982). Rehnquist J. spoke for the 
majority in laying down three conditions the plaintiff must show for standing : (1.) « he 
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury » as a result of the impugned 
act ; (2.) the injury « fairly can be traced to the challenged action » ; and (3.) )he injury is 
«likely to be redressed by a favourable decision». Nevertheless, he added several 
« prudential principles » which would still permit standing in other circumstances. 
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It was not until 1987 that the Supreme Court of Canada was presented 
with facts in which a citizen challenged an administrative decision : Min-
ister of Finance of Canada et al. v. Finlay34. Le Dain J., speaking for the 
Court in the first post-Charter35 standing case, attempted to encapsulate 
the facts and issue of the case in the following memorable passage : 
This appeal raises the question whether a private individual has standing to sue for 
a declaration that certain payments out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of 
Canada are illegal on the ground that they are not made in accordance with the 
applicable statutory authority. More specifically, the question is whether a re-
cipient of provincial assistance to persons in need, who claims to be prejudiced by 
certain provisions of the provincial legislation respecting such assistance, should 
be recognized as having standing to seek a declaration that payments by the 
federal government to the provincial government of contributions to the cost of 
such assistance, pursuant to the Canada Assistance Plan, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-l 
(hereinafter referred to as «the Plan»), are illegal, as being contrary to the 
authority conferred by the Plan, because the provincial legislative provisions 
complained of do not comply with the conditions and undertakings to which the 
federal cost-sharing payments are made subject by the Plan36. 
In addition to the Borowski criteria37, Le Dain J. asked whether « the 
court ha[d] a discretion to recognize public interest standing in the circum-
stances of the present [administrative law] case38 ? » His Lordship ana-
lyzed the applicability of the Borowski criteria to non-constitutional issues : 
Thorson, McNeil and Borowski cannot be regarded as providing clear and direct 
authority for the recognition of public interest standing, as a matter of judicial 
34. Minister of Finance of Canada et al. v. Finlay, (1987) 33 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.) 
(hereinafter Finlay). 
35. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
36. Finlay, supra, note 34 at 323. 
37. Finlay was found not to have a personal interest {id., at 334) : « I am on balance of the 
view that the relationship between the prejudice allegedly caused to the respondent by 
the provincial non-compliance [...] and the alleged illegality of the federal payments is 
too indirect, remote or speculative to be a sufficient causative relationship for standing 
under the general rule. The respondent must, therefore, in my opinion rely for standing 
on what is essentially a public interest in the legality of the federal cost-sharing pay-
ments, albeit that of a particular class of the public defined by the Plan as persons in 
need. » As for public or genuine interest, id., at 335, Le Dain J. had little trouble 
concluding that the appellant did indeed have a genuine interest both as a member of the 
public and more specifically as a member of a class of persons intended to have the 
benefit of the Plan. The Court adopted the passage of Thurlow C.J. of the Federal Court 
of Appeal, (1983) 146 D.L.R. (3d) 704 at 712, who noted: «In seeking to maintain this 
action he is by no means a mere busybody and it seems to me that his interest in having 
the matter determined is at least as strong as that of the respondent in the Borowski case 
[emphasis added]. » 
38. Id., at 326. 
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discretion, to bring a non-constitutional challenge by an action for a declaration to 
the statutory authority for public expenditure or other administrative action. It is 
fair to say, however, that they do not clearly exclude such recognition39. 
Given this latitude, the Court chose to extend public interest standing 
to administrative actions, embracing the logic of Operation Dismantle Inc. 
v. The Queen40. Le Dain J. asked and answered this question : 
The issue, then, as I see it, is whether the principle reflected in Thorson, McNeil 
and Borowski should be extended by this court to such cases [...] In my view an 
affirmative answer should be given to this question41. 
In reaching this conclusion, the judicial concerns involved in this 
extension were examined. The most important consideration was the re-
quirement of a « serious issue as to validity ». In otherwords, in primafacie 
cases, the benefit of the doubt should favour adjudication. The Borowski 
standards would adequately address legitimate concerns favouring re-
straint : 
[...] the concern about the allocation of scarce judicial resources and the need to 
screen out the mere busybody ; the concern that in the determination of issues the 
courts should have the benefit of the contending points of view of those most 
directly affected by them ; and the concern about the proper role of the courts and 
their constitutional relationship to the other branches of government. These 
concerns are addressed by the criteria for the exercise of the judicial discretion to 
recognize public interest standing to bring an action for a declaration that were laid 
down in Thorson, McNeil and Borowski*2. 
The result of this decision brings the criteria for standing within the 
administrative context. Any party who can meet the three-part Borowski 
test can challenge a board or tribunal's acts and decisions43. 
39. Id., at 339. 
40. Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (hereinafter Operation 
Dismantle). That is to say, where there is an issue appropriate for judicial determination, 
the courts should not decline to determine it on the ground that because of its policy 
context or implications it is better left for review and determination by the legislative or 
executive branches of government. See, Finlay, supra, note 34 at 340. 
41. Finlay, supra, note 34 at 339. 
42. Id., at 340. 
43. One should be aware that public interest standing prescriptions are far less generous in 
other common lawjurisdictions. Cory J. in Canadian Council of Churches, supra, note 2 
at 197-201 outlines equivalent tests elsewhere. He summarizes at 197: «The highest 
courts of the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States have struggled with the 
problem. They have all recognized the need to balance the access of public interest 
groups to the courts against the need to conserve scarce judicial resources [...] each of 
these jurisdictions has taken a more restrictive approach to granting status to parties 
than have the courts in Canada. » 
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3. Analysis of Common Law Representative Standing 
3.1 Representativeness 
A representative organization, such as a trade association, bringing a 
case on behalf of its members generates concerns about commonality of 
interest : how representative is the organization of the membership. It, 
therefore, raises issues similar to the class action suit45 where one party 
represents many with the same46 interests47. 
Although the parallel is tempting48, it should be apparent that class 
action rules do not directly contribute to this analysis of public law standing 
for representative bodies. Class actions are governed by the applicable 
rules of civil procedure in a jurisdiction. They operate in the context of 
private liability49, not a public law determination of government action. 
Class action rules are concerned with private rights of those parties in-
44. The distinction is drawn here with statutory standing where certain identified interest 
groups derive standing directly from applicable legislation. 
45. Class actions were first used over 250 years ago to join a number of interests where it was 
too cumbersome to have those interests heard separately. A class action is defined as an 
action where one or more individuals sue in a personal capacity as well as representing 
all others who have the same interest in the outcome of the proceeding. 
46. Naken v. General Motors Inc., 144 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.). Four owners of Firenza 
cars brought an action against General Motors on behalf of all Ontario purchasers for 
1971 and 1972, claiming that the cars were not «durable, tough and reliable» as 
guaranteed by the manufacturer. After a ten year battle just to determine if a class action 
was appropriate, the Supreme Court Canada found that it was not and dismissed the 
case. There have, of course, been class action suits since Naken. See, eg., Abramovic v. 
Canadian Pacific Ltd., (1989) 69 O.R. (2d) 487 and Air India Flight 182 Disaster 
Claimants v. Air India, (1987) 44 D.L.R. (4th) 317. Nevertheless, the courts are gen-
erally reluctant to allow them. Class actions («recours collectif») has existed in the 
Province of Quebec since 1978 : Loi sur le recours collectif, L.Q. .1978 c. 8. This Act 
introduced class actions in the Code de procédure civile (articles 992 to 1052). Ontario is 
the first common law province to make it easier to conduct a class action suit. In January 
1993, the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, was passed in an effort to 
establish guidelines that would accommodate both parties and the judicial system. 
47. The interest may be legislation. In Chastain v. British Columbia Hydro and Power 
Authority, (1973) 32 D.L.R. (3d) 100, an action was commenced by the Vancouver 
Community Legal Assistance Society on behalf of persons required to pay a deposit by 
B.C. Hydro to obtain electricity. The court found that despite the deposits being 
different, the plaintiff did represent a class of people with the same interests. The court 
could make a ruling on the legislation that allegedly allowed B.C. Hydro to demand 
deposits. The « same interest » was the legislation. 
48. Per Laskin J. (as he then was) in Thorson, supra, note 4, at 8: «I agree with the 
submission of counsel for the respondents that the appellant's taxpayer class action here 
is realistically a class action by a member of the public [emphasis added]. » 
49. Even then, class actions are generally limited to cases involving mass harm or injury. 
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eluded and excluded and the proper identification of class members. Rep-
resentativeness is a prerequisite to class actions as a means to ensure that 
the class action procedure itself is effective. Multiplicity of actions, civil 
process and other administration of justice issues are other factors which 
weigh prominently in application of the rules. 
Representative standing here has a peculiar focus on the mischief that 
inheres in permitting a party once removed from a direct interest in the 
subject matter to merely raise and argue the issue and have it decided. It is 
an inquiry as to who puts the objective matter of validity of government 
action before ajudge. Once done, the result is a public result, binding upon 
all to whom the law applies50. 
How, therefore, should representativeness relate to public law stand-
ing ? It is submitted that representativeness is not, and should not be, a 
critical factor on the basis of law. The outcome of the action applies to all 
members of the public equally and specialized facts are not in issue. Legal 
accountability of the applicant representor is minimal. In other words, if a 
statute is found ultra vires the legislature, how important is it to that result 
that the person bringing the question to court was not the most represen-
tative of the persons «directly affected»? Even most governments, at 
certain points in their mandates, and members of any court would encoun-
ter problems if they had to demonstrate that their actions accurately 
represented the interests of their constituents. 
Messrs. Thorson, McNeil, Borowski and Finlay were not found to be 
in any way representative of taxpayers or citizens in their respective 
challenges to legislation, but ostensibly represented only private idiosyn-
cratic interests. A motivated association, likewise, should not have to 
establish its credentials as to representativeness. Standing for them resided 
in that each personified a « directly affected » member. They ostensibly 
represented no one else. By contrast, representative bodies derive their 
legitimacy by the pre-qualification of representing others, which is the 
source of their « direct » or « genuine » interestt 
It would be a grievous miscalculation to devise a test where the extent 
of representativeness possessed by the organization is calibrated or scru-
tinized in each case. If some representativeness is demonstrated in order to 
establish «genuine interest», a court should not look further and deny 
standing on the basis that it could have been greater. That would be 
tantamount to a quantitative inquiry into the minds of Messrs. Thorson, 
50. On the other hand, the rules pertaining to class actions are parallel and instructive. If one 
accepts the need for the presumption of statutory validity and the reality of limited public 
resources to pass on constitutional and administrative law questions, some measure of 
motivating self-interest must be built into standing, as it is with class actions. 
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McNeil, Borowski and Finlay to determine how resolutely they held their 
respective opposition to government action. 
A minimum standard of representativeness would only serve to create 
a new ground to justify the denial of standing according to the superfluous 
impressions of the presiding judge. It would be a most unruly horse51. 
Evaluating the quality and quantity of representativeness will inexorably 
lead to impossible considerations about the age of the representative 
body52, its objects53, and formality54. Normative judgments about what is 
« representative » or « not representative » can and will lisue ffom all lidee 
of any factual constellation. A representativeness test is also likely to be 
fraught with practical difficulties of proof. In the absence of reliable quali-
tative evidence, the exercise may quickly reduce to a nominally quan-
titative one that is subject to manipulation and arbitrary standards. 
There is some direction in the case law toward proof of representative-
ness as a condition to standing55. These judicial detours do not serve to 
dispose of the issue. This trend is, one respectfully submits, an unsatisfac-
tory development for the reasons offered above. 
3.2 Serious Issue as to Validity 
Whether there exists à « serious issue of invalidity56 » is one that every 
party seeking standing must meet. It addresses government objections that 
51. Per Sir James Burrough in Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 2 Bing. 252: « Public policy is a 
very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you will never know where it will 
carry you. » 
52. Compare a long-standing organization with one which has recently come into existence. 
53. For example, the reason the organization was created. Does it exist to protect in a 
general way the interests of its members, or is the body charged primarily with managing 
the public law issue specifically at hand ? Was it born of the public law concern in issue ? 
54. Is the body incorporated, adequately financed and enduring or more loosely-con-
stituted ? 
55. An example is Energy Probe, supra, note 29. Carthy J.A. notes the eminence of 
individual scientists who joined the action and even one individual described as « a 
symbolic representative of the generally affected public » at 533 : « When I see serious 
individuals, such as the appellants in this case, presenting concerns that are of fun-
damental significance to all citizens, I have no hesitation in concluding that this is not an 
abuse of the public interest exception, but rather tends to serve it. » See also : Friends of 
Toronto Parkland v. Toronto (City), (1992) 6 O.R. (3d) 196 (Div. Ct.). 
56. This element is also known as «justiciability ». Several courts mis-applied this test, by 
distinguishing «justiciability » from « serious issue as to invalidity » : Coaliiion of 
Citizens for a Charter Challenge v. Metropolitan Authority and Reese v. Alberta both 
discussed infra, and by deciding standing wholly outside of the additional considerations 
of justiciability and reasonable cause of action: Association of Stop Construction of 
Rafferty Alameda Projects Inc. v. Saskatchewan (Minister of the Environment and 
Public Safety), discussed infra, note 97 at 244-250. 
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a reasonable cause of action is not raised. The court must decide if at least 
« some aspects57 » of the Statement of Claim raise a serious challenge to 
government action. The courts have been very liberal on this point, to the 
extent that one might question whether it operates as an independent 
criterion or whether it merely serves as a ground for confusion with the 
other two. 
If legislation, earlier found constitutionally sound, has been amended 
« that Act's validity [may be] no longer a foregone conclusion58 ». Some-
thing close to a. prima facie argument of invalidity, or at least a «triable 
issue59 », would have to be made out. « Purely academic appeals or those 
brought artificially » will not get status even when they rely on con-
stitutional arguments60. Claims should not be hypothetical, sweeping, po-
lemical or disjointed, but even these have survived this level of scrutiny61, 
which is minimal as judicially applied. The issues should, however, be ripe 
for determination62. Anticipatory actions may have standing denied also on 
the basis that there is another « reasonable and effective » means of bring-
ing the matter to court63. 
Does the constitutionality of, for example, any legislation establish 
justiciability ? One might argue that if it did in the pre-Charter era, that 
would certainly be the case today. In Thorson, Laskin J. (as he then was) 
seemed to be of this view64 : 
A more telling [than the floodgates concern] consideration for me [...] is whether a 
question of constitutionality should be immunized from judicial review by denying 
standing to anyone to challenge the impugned statute [...] The substantive issue 
raised by the plaintiffs action is a justiciable one ; and, prima facie, it would be 
strange and, indeed, alarming, if there was no way in which a question of alleged 
excess of legislative power, a matter traditionally within the scope of the judicial 
process, could be made the subject of adjudication. 
His Lordship was even more categorical later65 : 
The question of the constitutionality of legislation has in this country always been 
a justiciable question. Any attempt by Parliament or a Legislature to fix conditions 
57. Canadian Council of Churches, supra, note 82 at 205. 
58. Hy andZel's and Magder, per Major J., supra, note 31 at 661. 
59. This term was used by Carthy J.A. in Energy Probe, supra, note 29 at 529. 
60. Per Chouinard J.A. in Conseil du Patronat du Quebec Inc. c. Quebec (Attorney Gen-
eral), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 685, 87 D.L.R. (4th) 287 (cited to D.L.R.) (hereinafter Conseil du 
Patronat), at 526. Also, see Paquet v. Mines SNA Inc., [1986] R.J.Q. 1257 (C.A.). 
61. Canadian Council of Churches, supra, note 2 at 205. 
62. Coalition of Citizens for a Charter Challenge v. Metropolitan Authority, (1993) 12 
C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.S.C.A.) (hereinafter Coalition of Citizens), at 11. 
63. Eg. Hy and Zel's and Magder, supra, note 31. 
64. Thorson, supra, note 4 at 7. 
65. Id., at 11 (emphasis added). 
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precedent, as by way of requiring consent of some public officer or authority, to 
the determination of an issue of constitutionality of legislation cannot foreclose the 
Courts merely because the conditions remain unsatisfied [...] Should they then 
foreclose themselves by drawing strict lines on standing, regardless of the nature 
of the legislation whose validity is questioned ? 
The exercise of judgment can be somewhat circular, akin to discretion-
ary granting of leave to appeal. This is because the court must hear enough 
of the issue and argument to determine whether it has indeed a serious 
chance of success. The practice of hearing the entire case before pronounc-
ing on standing is not widespread to date66. However, it may become the 
common method of dealing with standing cases which are otherwise close 
to call67. Occasionally an appeal to a superior court will be framed in terms 
of specific questions, the first being standing and the remainder being 
substantive. It is not unusual in that case for the reviewing court, especially 
where the lower court did so, to pass judgment on the merits of the case 
before specifically turning to standing68. 
The more the explicit determination of standing is postponed in a case, 
the more it has evaporated as a specific or dispositive issue in that case69. 
Other factors such as the actual merits of the case and other judicial interest 
and preoccupation with it are more likely to determine the standing ques-
tion than the tests for standing themselves. 
3.3 Genuine Interest 
A representative organization will encounter the task of showing a 
«genuine interest » in the subject matter of the action. It usually will not 
have any since it is personally removed from the subject matter. Instead, it 
represents a group, one presumes, of «genuinely interested» legal per-
sons. It has an interest, if not a duty, to do that well. That is its interest : to 
vindicate the « genuine interests » of its membership. 
66. The approach has been used in the past. See, eg. the comments of Duff J. in Smith, 
supra, note 18, at 194D.L.R.,338(S.C.R.): « we are loath to give ajudgment against the 
appellant solely based upon a fairly disputable point of procedure ; and, accordingly we 
think it right to say that in our opinion the appellant's action also fails in substance ». 
67. This was the view of Laskin C.J.C. who wrote the unanimous opinion in McNeil, supra, 
note 20. He said at pp. 633-634 : « In granting leave, this Court indicated that where, as 
here, there is an arguable case for according standing, it is preferable to have all the 
issues in the case, whether going to procedural regularity or propriety or to the merits, 
decided at the same time. A thoroughgoing examination of the challenged statute could 
have a bearing in clarifying any disputed question on standing. » 
68. A good example is Hi-Fi Novelty Co. et al. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), (1992) 117 
N.S.R. (2d) 142, 324 A.P.R. 142 (S.C.), aff d on appeal : (1994) 126 N.S.R. (2d) 70, 352 
A.P.R. 70, discussed infra, note 126. 
69. See, Energy Probe, supra, note 29. In this case, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered 
the merits of the action in some detail. 
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From the three-part test developed by the standing trilogy described 
above, it is clear that «genuine interest » is fungible70. It need not be the 
most proximate personal interest. Borowski could not have suffered an 
abortion as a woman or a fetus. Nevertheless he was accorded standing for 
little more than his views on the (in)validity of the legislation : « [a] person 
need only to show that his is affected by it directly or that he has a genuine 
interest as a citizen11 ». In such a scenario, the simple belief in the invalidity 
of the public act complained of should found standing.Most associations, in 
their day to day protection of their members' interests, and in consultation 
with their members, would be capable of forming this honest belief72. 
« Reputation » of the applicant73, demonstration of « a real and con-
tinuing interest in the problems » of the affected private parties74, and the 
nature of the impugned legislation itself75 may also be indicia tending to 
support a finding of «genuine interest ». 
This article has so far defined the « genuine interest » of the nominal 
applicant, the representative body, as one which is derived vicariously 
from its corporate objects and contractual mandate. The court can view a 
representative body as the voice of its members, treating the body as it 
would one of its members. This conceptual model for representative stand-
ing may be fashioned from simple agency principles. The representor may 
be seen to possess lawful agency authority to efficiently and directly 
represent a number of «directly affected » parties. It is, accordingly, the 
particular interests of the individual members which are being litigated, and 
not those of the representative organization itself. 
70. T.A. CROMWELL, note 12 at 163, op. cit., refers to a determination of the «directly 
affected » as « traversing a semantic wasteland similar to that encountered in deciding 
who has an « interest », who suffers « special injury » or who ii s a «erson aggrieved d ». 
71. Borowski, supra, note 21 (emphasis added). 
72. Eg. in Mathias Colomb Band of Indians et al. v. Saskatchewan Power Corporation 
(unreported, January 5,1994), the Manitoba Court of Appeal found that « the Band does 
have status in light of their [sic] special and direct interest in the subject matter of the 
litigation ». 
73. Canadian Council of Churches, supra, note 2 at 205. 
74. Ibid. 
75. The more it personally and coercively impacts upon the applicant as in the case of 
criminal or regulatory legislation with offences and penalties, compared to merely 
administrative or declaratory legislation, the more palpable the interest : Thorson, 
supra, note 4. This distinction is a laboured one, however, and may be falling out of 
favour: see, eg. the dictum of Laskin C.J.C. in McNeil, supra, note 20 at 635. 
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3.4 No Other Reasonable and Effective Manner 
to Bring the Issue to Court 
This requirement can theoretically pose a special problem for rep-
resentative associations. Often any member of the group would be under 
no substantive disability to bring the matter before the court itself. 
Is this, however, a « reasonable and effective » alternative ? If cost, 
time or estrangement of the working relationship practically rules out the 
individual member bringing the issue to court, giving standing to the trade 
association may be the only « reasonable and effective » means to adjudica-
tion. The «reasonable and effective manner» is a highly and, one might 
propose, deliberately vague qualification for standing, but nevertheless the 
one which « lies at the heart of the discretion to grant public interest 
standing76 ». It may be invoked to thwart the exasperating litigious ambi-
tions of the mere «busybody77 ». If an applicant can demonstrate some 
serious approach to the issue, a substantive connection with it, and a 
realistic probability that no one else will pursue the matter78, this test will 
likely be satisfied. 
Representative bodies are usually under legal and contractual respon-
sibility to their members. By clothing them with an economic or political 
interest, they should not be found in the realm of « busybody ». That they 
are assigned or delegated the task of bringing and sustaining the action on 
behalf of the members is an answer to whether there is another reasonable 
and effective manner of doing it. 
76. Hy andZel's and Magder, supra, note 31 at 662. 
77. The term belongs to Thurlow C.J., supra, note 37, but was adopted by LeDain J. in 
Finlay, supra, note 34 at 340. 
78. In Borowski, supra, note 21 at 596-597, Laskin C.J.C., dissenting, would have denied 
Borowski standing on this basis : 
[...] there are persons with an interest in the operation of [Criminal Code] s. 
251(4), (5) and (6) who might challenge it [...] I am referring to doctors and to 
hospitals, both having a clearer interest in the operation of s. 251(4, (4) and (6) 
than does the plaintiff. Husbands, who might object to their pregnant wives 
seeking a therapeutic abortion also have a clearer interest [...]. 
The willingness or refusal of a hospital board to establish a therapeutic abortion 
committee can create tensions, whatever the outcome. The interest of hospitals 
and of doctors is, in my view, a direct interest arising from the Criminal Code 
provisions under challenge here, but at worst is a more compelling and im-
mediate interest than that asserted by the plaintiff. His interest is not connected 
with the administration of the legislation but with an emotional response to its 
operation. I see nothing in such a response which should persuade this Court to 
open its judicial doors to him. 
On the other hand, logistical convenience such as the common use of one lawyer for all 
joint applicants and « an increased potential for recovery of costs » can operate to make 
the action «effective and reasonable » : Energy Probe, supra, note 69 at 531. 
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That there is « no other reasonable and effective manner in which the 
issue may be brought before a court » may be prima facie demonstrated if 
the Attorney-General is asked79 but declines to act on behalf of the plain-
tiff80. 
The leading case81 in Canada on « other reasonable or effective man-
ner» is the Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Em-
ployment and Immigrationf.. The Canadian Council of Churches, an 
incorporated body representing the interests of a broad group of member 
churches, challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Immigra-
tion Act83. These amendments affected refugees directly by altering the 
procedures to determine whether applicants came within the definition of 
Convention refugee. Cory J., speaking for a unanimous Court, reduced the 
« no other reasonable and effective manner » criterion to a consideration of 
whether government action is « immunized [...] from any challenge84 ». He 
concluded that the Council be denied standing. 
79. Or, as in McNeil, supra, note 20, if the vagaries of the Canadian federal system obscure 
jurisdictional responsibility. 
80. See, Thorson, supra, note 4 at 11, per Laskin J. (for the majority) : « Short of a reference 
either to a provincial appellate Court by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council or to this 
Court by the Governor-General in Council, is there any other way in which the validity 
of a statute [...] can be determined in a judicial proceeding when the federal Attorney-
General has declined to Act ? » And at 15 : « II those eases where the restrictive erinciple 
of requiring carriage of the suit by the Attorney-General and denying any suit if the 
Attorney-General refuses to act, has been cast aside, the rationale of the ratepayer's 
action has been explained in various ways, dependent, it seems to me, on the factual 
situation in the particular case. » See, also, McNeil, supra, note 20 at 634-35. Per Laskin 
C.J.C. for the court : 
[McNeil] also requested the Attorney-General to refer the constitutionality of 
the provincial Act to the Appeal Division, but was unable to elicit any affir-
mative or negative response to his request. Indeed, in correspondence with the 
respondent's counsel, counsel for the Attorney-General took the position that 
the Act was intra vires and there appeared to be no right in the respondent to 
attack its validity. Thereafter, the respondent brought his application for a 
declaration. 
In my opinion, the respondent took all steps that he could reasonably be 
required to take in order to make the question of his standing ripe for consider-
ation. 
81. Applied and followed recently by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hy and Zel's and 
Magder, which are discussed infra, note 131. 
82. Canadian Council of Churches, supra, note 2. 
83. Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, as am. by S.C. 1988, c. 35 and c. 36. 
84. Canadian Council of Churches, supra, note 2 at 204 : «The whole purpose of granting 
status is to prevent the immunization of legislation or public acts from any challenge. 
The granting of public interest standing is not required when, on a balance of proba-
bilities, it can be shown that the measure will be subject to attack by a private litigant. » 
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An apparent pre-occupation of Cory J. was the problem of scarce 
judicial resources, which was raised numerous times in the judgment85. 
Accordingly, but nevertheless curiously, he saw this case as calling for 
« extension » of the trilogy tests86. Put that way, ,i ts not surprising that he 
answered in the negative87 : « The principles for granting public standing 
set forth by this court need not and should not be expanded. » 
While Cory J. seemed to advocate a restriction of the trilogy princi-
ples, and particularly the «other reasonable and effective manner» cri-
terion, he stated the opposite88: «None the less, when exercising the 
discretion the applicable [trilogy] principles should be interpreted in a 
liberal and generous manner. » 
Cory J. found that the Council raised a serious issue of invalidity89 and 
even that they had a genuine interest in refugees90. However, he held that 
this challenge could most reasonably and effectively be brought by the 
most directly affected parties, the refugee claimants themselves91 : 
From the material presented, it is clear that individual claimants for refugee status, 
who have every right to challenge the legislation, have in fact done so. There are, 
therefore, other reasonable methods of bringing the matter before the court. On 
this ground the applicant Council must fail. I would hasten to add that this should 
not be interpreted as a mechanistic application of a technical requirement [...] 
Here, there is no such immunization as plaintiff refugee claimants are challenging 
85. Id., a statement at p. 204 is typical : « I would stress that the recognition of the need to 
grant public interest standing in some circumstances does not amount to a blanket 
approval to grant standing to all who wish to litigate an issue. It is essential that a balance 
be struck between ensuring access to the courts and preserving judicial resources. It 
would be disastrous if the courts were allowed to become hopelessly overburdened as a 
result of the unnecessary proliferation of marginal or redundant suits brought by well-
meaning organizations pursuing their own particular cases certain in the knowledge that 
their cause is all important. It would be detrimental, if not devastating, to our system of 




89. Cory J. found so begrudgingly, id., at 205 : «The claim makes a wide, sweeping and 
somewhat disjointed attack upon most of the multitudinous amendments... Some of the 
allegations are so hypothetical in nature that it would be impossible for any court to make 
a determination with regard to them. In many ways the statement of claim more closely 
resembles submissions that might be made to a parliamentary committee considering the 
legislation than it does an attack on the validity of the legislation. » 
90. Id., at 205. 
91. Id., at 206-207. 
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the legislation. Thus, the very rationale for the public interest litigation party 
disappears92. 
The Supreme Court of Canada thus resisted hearing an organization 
when directly-affected parties were actually already bringing forward the 
issue93. There may, however, been factors, other than judicial resources, 
which were responsible for the denial of standing in that case. One that 
went unacknowledged was that the Council was primarily established to 
represent the interests of churches, not refugees. It had effectively volun-
teered this advocacy function on behalf of a defined group, and did not hold 
any specific formal mandate of representation94. Another was the political 
manner in which this challenge was mounted. The Court referred twice to 
« the fact that the action was brought on the first working day following the 
passage of the legislation » by a group which had just earlier tried to 
influence the legislators95. 
It is clear that Canadian Council of Churches does not advance the 
position of public interest litigants96. Its scenario is, nevertheless, distin-
guishable from the truly representative body composed of directly-affected 
parties and which organization is mandated to bring the action on their 
behalf, not in duplication of their efforts. 
The distinction between an organization whose purpose includes serv-
ing directly-affected parties and one whose membership is also composed 
of them may now be decisive to the issue of public law standing. Such a 
distinction may have a valid claim to recognition so that, for example, the 
first category of representative group should never attain standing while 
92. The Court rejected the proposition that refugees, as a group, suffered disadvantages that 
stood in their way to effective access to court. Further, the possibility of 72-hour 
removal orders depriving refugee claimants of constitutional arguments was not mate-
rial. The Court pointed out that, in practice, these orders would not normally be 
enforced with that effect. See, dicta of Cory J. at 205-207. It would be important to 
observe how many of these refugee appeals referred to actually experienced the full 
range of constitutional argument and appeal, which process could have a major impact 
on the numerous administrative appeals the Court used to justify the denial of standing. 
93. H. SCOTT FAIRLEY in his somment oo this sase, «Is the eublic Interest Falling grom 
Standing ? Two Recent Comments From the Supreme Court of Canada », Philanthrop. 
No. 4, 1993, p. 28 at 33, posits a different conclusion : « The key question, of course, is 
whether the result [...] merely affirms or rolls back the status quo. There is a basis for the 
latter point of view ; even though the Court professes adherence to existing norms, it is 
retreating from them. » 
94. This should not detract from the fact that the Council, on the other hand, had directly 
participated in refugee resettlement and development of refugee policy and procedure in 
Canada and abroad for many years : Canadian Council of Churches, supra, note 2 at 195. 
95. Canadian Council of Churches, supra, note 2 at 195 and 205. 
96. C. MCCOOL, «Public Interest», chapter 3 of THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 
SOCIETY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, op. cit., note 11, at 3.1.05. 
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the second might do so automatically or as a matter of judicial discretion. 
Alternatively, the claim could be made that the second category should 
always have standing while, in the case of the first category, it should 
depend on judicial discretion. 
4. Standing for Representative Bodies in Light of Recent Case Law 
In addition to the judicial decisions described above, a number of 
others are useful in illuminating the generally uneven application of the 
trilogy principles in the name of discretion. 
4.1 Rafferty Alameda \. Saskatchewan 
The courts have exhibited flexibility when granting a representative 
body standing, finding « genuine interest » in a variety of ways. In Associa-
tion to Stop Construction ofRafferty Alameda Project Inc. v. Saskatch-
ewan (Minister of Environment and Public Safety) and Souris Basin 
Development Authority91, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench 
awarded standing to the Association which wished to challenge the 
proposed construction of a dam. The Court found that some of the Associa-
tion's members who lived in the area where the dam was to be built were 
« directly affected98 ». 
4.2 Reese v. Alberta 
The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench took a different approach to 
reach the same result in similar circumstances. In Reese, Alberta Wilder-
ness Association, Peace River Environmental Society and Sierra Club of 
Western Canada v. Alberta", one individual and three organizations chal-
lenged a Forest Management Agreement that allowed Daishowa Canada 
Co. Ltd. to construct a second pulp mill and increase production in the 
Peace River area. McDonald J. found that the four challenging the Agree-
ment did not have a direct or personal interest. The judge continued100: 
However, in my view nothing said in Finlay drives this court, in this case, to the 
conclusion that the Applicants lack « a genuine interest » as citizens in having the 
justiciable issue decided. 
97. Association to Stop Construction ofRafferty Alameda Project Inc. v. Saskatchewan 
(Minister of Environment and Public Safety) and Souris Basin Development Authority, 
(1988) 68 Sask. R. 52, 3 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 236 (cites to C.E.L.R.). 
98. Id., at 247. 
99. Reese Alberta Wilderness Association, Peace River Environmental Society and Sierra 
Club of Western Canada v. Alberta, (1992) 7 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 89,11 Admin. L. Rev. .2d) 
265 (Alta. Q.B.) ; additional reasons provided at (1992) 5 Aha. L. Rev. (3d) 40, ,33 A.R. 
127, 13 C.P.C. (3d) 323, 11 Admin. L. Rev. (2d) 265n (Q.B.). 
100. Id., at 10. 
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McDonald J. concluded101 : 
It is clear from the decision in Finlay that this court, in its discretion, may 
recognize that a private citizen or a group of citizens or a society has « public 
interest standing » to bring an action for declaratory relief, even in regard to an 
administrative action, which is challenged on non-constitutional grounds. 
4.3 Airport Taxicab v. Canada 
The representative body in Airport Taxicab (Malton) Association v. 
Canada (Minister of Transport) et al.102 represented various taxi and 
limousine companies. It objected to the regulations imposed by the Min-
ister of Transport on the flow of taxis and limousines into the Toronto 
International Airport. Any individual company belonging to the Associa-
tion could have challenged the regulation because each was directly and 
personally affected by it. The Trial Division of the Federal Court of Can-
ada, emphasizing its discretionary power, granted the Association standing 
using the Borowski principles103 : 
The second procedural item concerns the defendant's argument that the plaintiff 
association lacks status to commence this action. The defendant argues that 
although the individual shareholders and members of the plaintiff association 
which is an incorporated body have a direct interest in the taxicab and limousine 
permit system controlled by the defendant, the corporation itself, that is Airport 
Taxicab (Malton) Association (the plaintiff named herein), does not. 
I do not deny that the defendant's argument in this respect may have more than a 
little merit. However, jurisprudence on the question of standing, especially the 
decisions of [sic] Supreme Court of Canada [...] lead me to the conclusion that 
when the constitutional validity of legislation is being challenged, as is this case, 
the according of status to commence an action for declaratory relief is largely 
within the discretion of the Court... 
I am satisfied therefore that in the interest of justice the plaintiff should not be 
denied standing. 
4.4 Friends of the Island Inc. v. Canada 
The party pressing the action Friends of the Island v. Canada (Min-
ister of Public Works)104 was a public interest organization whose members 
were « farmers, fishermen, ferry workers and environmentalists resident in 
Prince Edward Island105 ». The government had argued that the coalition 
101. Id., at 13. 
102. Airport Taxicab (Malton) Association v. Canada (Minister of Transport) et al., (1987) 7 
F.T.R. 105 (F.C.C.T.D.). 
103. Id., at 111. 
104. Friends of the Island Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works), (1993) 10 C.E.L.R. 
(N.S.) 204, [1993] 2 F.C. 229, 102 D.L.R. (4th) 696, 61 F.T.R. 4 (cited to D.L.R.). 
105. Id., at 735. 
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did «not establish the requisite interest because it filed no material to 
establish its corporate objects or interest. The interests of its members or 
shareholders cannot be taken to be the interest of the applicant106. » Reed J. 
in the Federal Court disagreed107: 
There is abundant evidence establishing their [members'] individual interests. In 
my view, as I read the material which has been filed, there is also evidence that the 
objects of the corporate applicant, include, if not solely relate to activities directed 
at opposing the construction of the bridge. In my view, the applicant has proven 
that it has sufficient interest108... 
While this case is under appeal109, the matter of standing is not likely to 
radically change. The Supreme Court of Canada recently applied it110. 
4.5 Conseil du Patronat v. Quebec 
The most influential case of standing for representative bodies is 
Conseil du Patronat du Quebec Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney-General)11.. A 
non-profit corporation, the Conseil du Patronat, that represented many 
employers' federations and management associations. It sought to mount a 
Charter challenge of the provisions of the Quebec Labour Code, which 
prohibited the hiring of replacement workers during a strike112. The Conseil 
employed 15 persons, none of whom were unionized. There was clearly, 
therefore, no direct personal interest on the part of the Conseil in the 
validity of the labour legislation. The Quebec Superior Court denied stand-
ing on the bases that neither « l'intérêt suffisant » nor actual and excep-
tional prejudice to the Conseil were demonstrated. The Quebec Court of 
Appeal, Chouinard J. A. dissenting, dismissed the appeal by the Conseilx13. 
106. Id., at 734. 
107. Id., at 735. 
108. A further argument that the FederalCourt Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as amended by S.C. 
1990, c. 8, s. 18.1(1), which accorded standing only to persons «directly affected by a 
matter in respect of which relief is sought » precluded standing, was also rejected by the 
trial judge. 
109. Notices of Appeal were filed in the Federal Court of Appeal (consolidated Court File No. 
A255/93), see : (1993) 102 D.L.R. (4th) 696 note. To date, no appeal decision has been 
released. 
110. Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board), as yet unreported, 
S.C.C., Doc. 22705, February 24, 1994. 
111. Conseil du Patronat du Quebec Inc., supra, note 60. 
112. Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27, section 109.1. 
113. Conseil du Patronat du Quebec Inc. c. Québec, [1988] RJ.Q. 1516, (1989) 55 D.L.R. 
(4th) 523 (Que. C.A.) (cited to D.L.R.). The dissent of Chouinard J.A. is found at 1522-
1526 (R.J.Q.) and 525-531 (D.L.R.) (hereinafter Conseil du Patronat). 
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The Conseil du Patronat in its application described itself as : 
a non-profit corporation formed to promote the economic, social, and professional 
interests of 131 Quebec employers' federations and associations, as well as the 
interests of a large number of businesses which support it, representing about 70 % 
of the province's active labour force114. 
Moisan J. (ad hoc), writing for the majority, concluded that the Con-
seil did not have sufficient interest as an employer, a corporate citizen or as 
an employers' association115. Mailhot J.A. concurred with Moisan J. but 
added that116: 
there are other reasonable and effective means of bringing the issue before a court 
[...] An employer bound by the Labour Code, as association of employers within 
the meaning of s. 1 (c) of the Labour Code or an employer mentioned in a request 
for certification would, in my opinion, have the required interest. However, the 
Conseil du patronat, an employer not presently bound by the Labour Code, does 
not have the required interest [...]. 
Chouinard J.A. would have found the requisite Conseil interest117: 
With respect, I believe that requiring actual direct interest (or at the very least 
potential interest) for action in private law is incompatible with interest in matters 
of public appeal, involving the constitutionality of a statute. For example, any 
employer (even an employer with only one unionized employee) is deemed to have 
sufficient interest to challenge the constitutionality of the « anti-strike-breaking » 
law, but the Conseil du Patronat is denied the same right, even as an employer, 
although its purpose is to promote the interests of a very large number of em-
ployers or firms, a majority of whom appear to be unionized. That is not how 
I interpret the Supreme Court decisions [...]. 
Since the Conseil du Patronat speaks for its members, surely it has just as much 
interest as each of its members does. 
Efforts by the representative body to resolve the issue before resorting 
to litigation will be evidence of whether another suitable means could be 
invoked to bring the matter to court. One of the factors Chouinard J.A. 
thought was germane to standing was that : 
the Conseil du Patronat complained unsuccessfully to the Quebec Human Rights 
Commission [...] even asking the Attorney-General (on May, 1984) to take the 
issue before the Court of Appeal. Was this sufficient to come to the reasonable 
conclusion that there were no other suitable means of bringing the matter before 
the courts? It seems to me that the answer must be yes"8. 
Chouinard J.A. concluded that « since the Conseil du Patronat speaks 
for its members, it must have just as much interest as each of its members 
114. Id., at 527. 
115. Id., at 535-537. 
116. Id., at 532. 
117. Id., at 528. 
118. Id., at 526. 
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does119 ». The Conseil was compared to the group of corporations, busi-
nesses and organizations who collectively challenged the testing of cruise 
missiles in Operation Dismantle120'. The Supreme Court found this loose 
collection of organizations had sufficient interest to bring forward the 
issue. Chouinard J. A. would have likewise granted standing for the Conseil 
du Patronat121. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a short oraljudgment122, allowed the 
Conseil appeal, by «essentially123» adopting the dissenting reasons of 
Chouinard J.A. in the Quebec Court of Appeal124. 
4.6 Hi-Fi Novelty v. Nova Scotia 
The Nova Scotia distributors of coin-operated gaming machines to 
convenience stores, taverns, arcades and hotels were members of the 
Nova Scotia Music and Amusement Operators Association. The provincial 
government had decided to regulate video gambling. These distributors, as 
a result, lost money. The Association challenged the provincial video 
gambling regulations. The application, Nova Scotia Music and Amuse-
ment Operators Association v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)*25, was 
dismissed for lack of standing. The chambers judge found no merit in 
the constitutional question and accordingly, citing Canadian Council of 
Churches, saw no serious issue of invalidity presenting. He was also 
concerned that standing would fortify the distributors' criminal behaviour 
and that standing should be denied in such circumstances : 
This is not a criminal prosecution nor a criminal application, however, the evi-
dence clearly indicates that the conduct of the applicants based on a civil burden of 
balance of probabilities indicates criminal conduct. 
The chambers judge was also convinced that the matter would sooner 
or later come to court again by way of a defence to a prosecution under 
criminal or regulatory legislation. 
119. Id., at 528. 
120. Operation Dismantle Inc., supra, note 40. 
121. Chouinard J.A. at 530-531 of Conseil du Patronat, supra, note 113, describes it thus : 
« the highest court of the land granted standing to a very large number of corporations 
and organizations, who joined forces to bring an application, a situation similar to the 
case at bar thereby agreeing (at least implicitly) that the association had sufficient 
interest. » 
122. Conseil du Patronat, supra, note 111. 
123. Ibid. 
124. For two comments on this case, see H. TRUDEAU and D. VEILLEUX, «L'intérêt à agir en 
droit public à la suite de l'arrêt Conseil du patronat du Québec », (1992) 52 R. du B. 4i7 
and H.S. FAIRLEY, supra, note 93. 
125. Nova Scotia Music and Amusement Operators Association v. Nova Scotia (Attorney 
General, (1992) 113 N.S.R. (2d) 54, 309 A.P.R. 54 (S.C.). 
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In the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal126, the case was approached and 
decided with deference to original discretion127 : 
This court has said on several occasions that it will not interfere with a discretion-
ary order, particularly an interlocutory one such as this, unless wrong principles of 
law have been applied or a patent injustice would result. Simply because we may 
possibly have reached a decision contrary to that of the judge on the facts is not 
sufficient. The burden on the appellant is heavy [...] In our opinion, the appellants 
have failed to show that the chambers judge made any error of law or that any 
patent injustice arose from the decision which he has reached. 
This decision exemplifies the disquieting practice of hoisting locus 
standi on its own petard. If there is any sign that the declaratory judgment is 
still alive in Canadian law, it is difficult to envisage how these applicants did 
not have standing to pursue one. To make a decision on the merits, in 
effect, and then to ostensibly refuse status is to denature the concept and 
purpose of standing. 
4.7 Coalition of Citizens v. Metropolitan Authority 
A regional authority was charged to develop a solid waste man-
agement system. It sought public input and eventually approved a plan that 
called for 40 per cent waste incineration. Several individuals objected to 
this and formed the coalition which in turn commenced an action for a 
declaration that this decision contravened sections 7 and 15 of the Charter 
and two related provincial statutes. In Coalition of Citizens for a Charter 
Challenge v. Metropolitan Authority12*, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
eventually decided, in a judgment129 released one day after the Hi-Fi 
Novelty case above, that the coalition did not have status. 
The Court viewed the public environmental assessment hearings as an 
essential process to the ripening of this action. It found, therefore, by 
temporal impediment, there was not a serious justiciable issue to be tried. 
The outcome of the public hearings might render the action unnecessary. 
At the minimum, it would likely focus the issues since the original claim 
was in the nature of a wide-ranging attack on incineration generally. 
While the Court may not have been implicitly in favour of the composi-
tion of, and approaches taken by, the Coalition, it's concern expressed was 
about duplication and effective use of resources130: 
126. Hi-Fi Novelty Co. et al. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), (1994) 126 N.S.R. (2d) 70 
and 352 A.P.R. 70. 
127. Id., at 73-74, per Chipman J.A. for the Court. 
128. Coalition of Citizens, supra, note 62. 
129. Also written by Chipman J.A. 
130. Coalition of Citizens, supra, note 62 at 13. 
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The voluminous material before us on this very small segment of the dispute 
(relating to standing) shows very clearly what a massive undertaking this litigation 
would become. The attitude of the parties revealed through the materials ten-
dered, and the manner in which the case has been argued on their behalf, indicates 
that co-operation will be at a minimum. To one with even the slightest familiarity 
with the process of the courts and the time consumed in litigation, it is clear that 
this case shapes up as promising to be one of the most complex, expensive and 
time-consuming civil trials in the history of this province—if it is allowed to get off 
the ground. The numerous discovery proceedings, interlocutory motions with 
possible appeals therefrom and case management meetings can be all too easily 
visualized. 
4.8 Hy and Zel's and Paul Magder Furs Ltd. v. Ontario 
The Supreme Court of Canada's more technical focus on «other 
reasonable and effective manner», prominent in Canadian Council of 
Churches, continued in this case131. The two corporate applicants and 
some of their employees applied for a declaration that the Ontario Retail 
Business Holidays Act132, which mandated the closure of their stores on 
certain days of the year, was unconstitutional as violating religious and 
equality rights under the Charter. These applications were initiated in 
response to the Attorney-General's motion for orders requiring these 
stores to close on a holiday. The court was willing to assume, without 
deciding, that corporations can enjoy such rights, but noted that none of the 
appellants had alleged infringement of their own particular rights. 
Major J. writing for the majority of the Court133, disposed of the case 
on the basis of standing, although it would not seem to have been a formal 
stated issue134 and was not addressed in the lower courts135. After com-
131. Hy and Zel's ana Magder, supra, note 31. The two causes emerged procedurally at the 
same time and were joined and decided together. 
132. Rentail Business Holidays Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 453, as amended. 
133. Lamer C.J.C., La Forest, Sopinka. Gonthier, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. concurring. 
134. See statement of the two Charter issues by Major J. : Hy and Zeis and Magder, supra, 
note 31 at 659. 
135. Id., at 662. Major J. explained this quoting Le Dain J. in Finlay, supra, note 34 at 328 : « a 
court's ability to consider standing at the outset « depends on the nature of the issues 
raised and whether the court has sufficient material before it, in the way of allegations of 
fact, considerations of law, and argument, for a proper understanding at a preliminary 
stage of the nature of the interest asserted. » Since the appellants' case has proceeded 
without trial, the situation is akin to determining standing as a preliminary point. » This 
rationale is clearly flawed. If standing is not raised in early court applications and 
decisions are rendered, even without a full trial, it must be implicitly ceded. If the court is 
concerned with effective utilization of judicial resources, one must question the wisdom 
of denying standing in a reasoned judgment at the level of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in favour of another more « reasonable and effective manner of bringing the issue before 
the court ». 
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meriting that Magder had « worn a wide path to the courthouse over the 
past 10 years'36 », Major J. pointed out that the bar to standing was high for 
civil applicants seeking declaratory relief by alleging a Charter infrin-
gement137 : 
The appellants have brought civil applications for declaratory relief. A party's 
ability to attack a legislation's constitutional validity on Charter grounds is more 
difficult to establish in a civil suit than in a criminal prosecution. 
He then applied the trilogy tests. A serious issue as to validity was 
made out by virtue of the amendments to the legislation since its con-
stitutionality was confirmed in J?, v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd.138. The 
appellants were directly affected because they were specifically subject to 
prosecution under the impugned statute. 
The parties failed on the inquiry as to whether « other reasonable and 
effective » means existed of bringing the matter to court. However, the 
precise reasons are not clear. Major J. suggests that it may be because 
« almost no original evidence in support of their claim139 » was presented. 
Presumably he was motivated by judicial fondness for a clean and compre-
hensive prosecution file where private standing to defend on constitutional 
grounds would be assured. 
Deficiency of evidence is a foreseeable defect of the summary proce-
dure followed in this case. One might question the use of standing princi-
ples to kill consideration of this action's merits on that ground alone140. His 
Lordship further found that, unlike in the circumstances of Borowski, the 
legislation in question « does not discourage challenge141 » which is to say 
that the legislation is not « immunized » from iit Nevertheless, ,t is difficult 
to conceive of a substantially more « reasonable and effective » means of 
bringing this issue to court once it was actually before the court, having 
found that the litigants are directly affected and that there is a serious issue 
as to validity. 
In what could be the most serious blow to public law standing was the 
following statement of the Court142 : « Nor do the appellants have standing 
on the basis that their own religious rights have been violated. » 
136. Id., at 657. 
137. Id., at 660. 
138. R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., (1986) 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 30C.C.C. (3d) 385, [1986] 2 
S.C.R. 713. 
139. Hy and Zel's and Magder, supra, note 31 at 662. 
140. By contrast, L'Heureux-Dubé J., in dissent, distinguished the issue of standing from the 
question of the sufficiency of evidence : id., at 654-655. It is submitted that this is the 
correct approach. 
141. Id., at 663. 
142. Ibid. 
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It is too early to tell whether this is a new fourth test for standing in 
such cases, or whether it was propounded in error or simply ambiguous 
terms. «Direct effect » or « genuine interest » was historically establlshed 
as the threshold connection for public interest litigation. It was clearly 
demonstrated in this particular case. If litigants must now show a violation 
of their own rights, one might inquire what became of Borowski. What has 
become of anticipatory and declaratory actions ? Most of the public in-
terest cases have been either anticipatory (for example, Operation Dis-
mantle and Energy Probe) or declaratory (for example, the trilogy cases) or 
both (for example, Conseil du Patronat). 
This statement can be interpreted to wholly eliminate the public in-
terest standing, since it is a concept which has its essence in the vindication 
of the rights of others. If the litigant must show that « their own rights have 
been violated » is private interest standing all that is left143 ? 
L'Heureux-Dubé J. dissented144, finding « no principled or practical 
reason to refuse » standing here145 and would have granted standing on the 
basis that these appellants suffered exceptional prejudice due to the special 
effect of the legislation against their interests. The affected parties were 
before the court, in an existing controversy and it should have been 
resolved to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings146. 
Conclusion 
Public interest standing has been described, with some justification, as 
« one of the most criticized aspects of constitutional law147 ». The various 
discretionary prescriptions which have evolved since Thor son suffer from 
the problem of fusing together. Judges continue to disagree on their con-
tent148 and application. Judicial analyses provide little guidance to parties 
and courts alike. Discrete, but misleadingly simple, terms such as « spe-
cially affected », « extraordinary prejudice » and « genuine interest » may 
143. The context in which this statement was made once again stressed the importance of 
deciding these cases in a concrete factual framework. See, id., Major J. at 663 where he 
cites the Court in Danson v. Ontario (Attorney-General), (1990) 73 D.L.R. (4th) 686, 
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, 43 C.P.C. (2d) 165 at 691 (D.L.R.): «the failure of a diffuse 
challenge could prejudice subsequent challenges to the impugned rules by parties with 
specific and factually established complaints ». It is important to remember that con-
crete factual backgrounds are rarely found in anticipatory and declaratory cases. 
144. McLachlin J. concurring. 
145. Hy and Zel's and Magder, supra, note 31 at 656. 
146. Id., at 652. 
147. L.H. TRIBE, American Constitutional Law, 2nd ed., Mineola, New York, Foundation 
Press, Inc., 1988, p. 110. 
148. See, eg. majority and minority opinions in Hy and Zel's and Magder, supra, note 31. 
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no longer dominate the analysis, but the hoary replacement, judicial discre-
tion, is hardly an improvement. 
The golden age of liberal public interest standing is plainly gone. It is 
difficult to imagine the courthouse gates being ever again opened as wide as 
they were during the apogee of Borowski, even though Laskin C.J.C. was 
already by then sounding the floodgate alarm149. Even Conseil du Patronat 
and Canadian Council of Churches are hard to reconcile, though they were 
decided a scant six weeks apart150. Suddenly the standing dialectic is to be 
decided on the minimalist grounds of whether government action is « im-
munized » from challenge and how overworked the judges are. 
The restraint began with Canadian Council of Churches, which is now 
invariably cited to justify refusing standing. When the highest court in the 
land tells refugees that they must themselves litigate the constitutionality of 
their legal proceedings, one can hear the doors closing on public interest 
litigation. Starting with this case, the Supreme Court of Canada shifted the 
emphasis from the control of abuse of process to control of courthouse 
backlogs. 
This has continued with tighter standing restrictions being currently 
defended on the additional rationale of the need for a full factual matrix 
upon which to frame a substantive adjudication. This is evident in the dicta 
of Major J. in Hy and Zel's and Magder151 : 
[...] the court's vigilance [is] in ensuring that it hears the arguments of the parties 
most directly affected by a matter. In the absence of facts specific to the ap-
pellants, both the court's ability to ensure that it hears from those most directly 
affected and that Charter issues are decided in a proper factual context are 
compromised132. 
The lack of a concrete factual context is a circumstance which vir-
tually always attends, and has always attended, by its very nature, public 
interest litigation. To turn away cases lacking a specific factual basis is 
149. Until Canadian Council of Churches, supra, note 2, the courts were not as concerned 
with overflowing dockets. See, Thorson, supra, note 4 at 6-7. 
150. December 6, 1991 (Conseil du Patronat) to January 23, 1992 (Canadian Council of 
Churches). 
151. Hy and Zel's and Magder, supra, note 31 at 663. 
152. His Lordship quoted with approval a passage from MacKay v. Manitoba, (1989) 61 
D.L.R. (4th) 385, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, 43 C.R.R. 1 at 388(D.L.R.)) : Charter recisions 
should not and must not be made in a factual vacuum. To attempt to do so would 
trivialize the Charter and inevitably result in ill-considered opinions. The presentation of 
facts is not, as stated by the respondent, a mere technicality ; rather, it is essential to a 
proper consideration of Charter issues. A respondent cannot, by simply consenting to 
dispense with the factual background, require or expect a court to deal with an issue such 
as this in a factual void. Charter decisions cannot be based upon the unsupported 
hypotheses of enthusiastic counsel. » 
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tantamount to turning away public interest cases because they are public 
interest cases. 
Temporal impediments, such as issue ripening, will always beg the 
standing question. A court can always say that the issue is not ripe. If it 
desires to constrain standing, the ground enjoying the greatest currency, 
aside from justiciability, is the « other reasonable and effective method of 
bringing the manner to court ». By the definition of public interest litiga-
tion, there will almost always be someone better situated to bring the 
action. The question is how strictly the court should apply this principle. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, or at least its Chief Justice, appreciates 
that the traditional adversarial system is a deficient model for both raising 
public law questions and for analyzing them153. Our highest courts are 
furthermore increasingly occupied with social policy, a role which does not 
land itself inherently, to factual precision. Madam Justice McLachlin re-
cently highlighted this dilemma thus154: 
[...] the courts are, whether they like it or not, required to give judgments on 
matters of social policy [...]. 
Whatever the reasons, it seems clear that [...] the agenda of courts in the years to 
come is going to take on an increasingly social face. Gone are the days whenjudges 
could spend their days musing on the principles of contract, tort and criminal law. 
Their field include [sic] these, but much more as welll 
The simple fact is that judicial decisions on such [social policy] questions matter 
more, and to more people [...] Decisions on social policy issues may affect 
thousands, if not millions, of people who may have nothing to do with the lawsuit. 
The result is an expectation-indeed a demand-from the public as a whole or from 
important interest groups within the public, that the judge has properly considered 
all the factors relevant to his decision and its consequences. 
As society becomes even more complex and spawns more regulation, 
which in turn calls for more judicial review, it is clear that anticipatory and 
declaratory judgments will be more elusive in Canada. These kinds of 
judgment can economize on judicial resources, by virtue of their preven-
153. Per Lamer C.J.C. in the Alexander Thane Lecture in Law, Charlottetown, Prince 
Edward Island, March, 1993 at p. 11 : «[The Charter has] stretched [our traditional 
adversary system] beyond its limits [We may find] our traditional adversary proceedings 
poorly designed to deal with cases where the issue is not the dispute between the parties, 
so much as the validity of legislation. » 
154. MCLACHLIN J., supra, note 11, pp. 1.1.04-06. 
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tative function. Their usefulness and availability were acknowledged in 
1985 by the Supreme Court of Canada in Operation Dismantle155. 
The effective use of resources test does not advance standing analysis. 
It is always open to assert that the court could better spend its time on other 
things. If this concern was permitted to control the negotiation of what 
cases are heard, courts would never feel moved to grant standing in public 
interest cases. Certainly periodic judicial workloads cannot be the deter-
mining factor in which such cases get standing. 
The conservation of judicial resources rationale in foreclosing stand-
ing may also itself be based upon a false economy. To decide standing first 
at the appellate level, to adjudicate on the merits and then refuse standing, 
to demonstrate variable degrees of respect for original discretion, to deny 
standing on the basis of incomplete pleadings or factual presentation, to 
encourage multitudes of fragmented, personally-affected parties to navi-
gate the waters of countless administrative and constitutional cases to 
present the invalidity question while at the same time hurling the represen-
tative dossier out of court—these actions will not promote the most 
effective use of judicial resources. Public interest litigation is arguably 
among the most effective use of resources. 
A cynic might suggest that the new found discretion and workload has 
actually played out in the selection of cases according to the political 
proclivities of judges. In the tone of several of the more recent judicial 
decisions, the configuration and modus operandi of the applicants may 
have been the determining factors as to standing. As tests are refined and 
formulated, it is submitted that discretion will follow impressions. Standing 
was refused where the litigant came close to abuse of court process (eg. 
Magder), or law-breaking (eg. Hy andZel's and Magder), was considered, 
albeit not labelled, a busybody (eg. Canadian Council of Churches), or was 
in an insalubrious business such as video gambling (eg. Hi-Fi Novelty), or 
exhibited hasty and persistent behaviour (eg. Metropolitan Authority). 
Nuclear power (eg. Operation Dismantle and Energy Probe) and environ-
mental (eg. Rafferty Alameda, Reese and Friends of the Island) concerns 
are, on the other hand, more likely to be heard. In many more cases, such 
155. Operation Dismantle, supra, note 40, per Wilson J. at 490, quoting from Borchard, 
Declaratory Judgments, 2nd ed. (1941), at 27 : « no « injury » or « wrong » need have 
been actually committed or threatened in order to enable the plaintiff to invoke the 
judicial process ; he need merely show that some legal interest or right of his has been 
placed in jeopardy or grave uncertainty, by denial, by the existence of a potentially 
injurious instrument, by some unforeseen event or catastrophe the effect of which gives 
rise to dispute, or by the assertion of a conflicting claim by the defendant ». 
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as to affirm a provincial tax on alcohol156 or the validity of the criminal 
sanctions against assisted-suicide157, standing was not even raised as an 
issue. 
An action launched by a truly representative body, unlike for statutory 
standing, intervenor status and class actions is a special transaction be-
cause it raises public law questions and because it does so for members who 
are interested. To see it as a party directly affected by the outcome of the 
action depends upon one's perspective and abiding willingness to receive 
the issue for adjudication158. The classification of such actions distinguish-
ing them from others has not been done to date in Canada, with the result 
that each case may be considered as unnecessarily crowding the docket. 
There is good legal principle in notions of « genuine interest » and agency to 
grant standing. There is also sound public policy in the forms of conve-
nience, finality and avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings to justify stand-
ing to a representative body to raise public law questions as a matter of 
course. Collectivities may also be seen to have a more legitimate claim to 
standing as representatives of the public interest than individuals. 
Public interest standing in Canada, which started with Thorson has 
truly come full cycle in 20 years with the decision of Hy and Zel's and 
Magder. Browsing the law reports today, one observes that representative 
bodies are still getting into court to have their concerns adjudicated. Many 
« Friends », « Associations » and « «oalitions s »ases sd oot even nncoun-
ter the issue by way of defence. The most recent appellate pronouncements 
may change that. 
As a threshold matter, nevertheless, public interest standing needs to 
be clarified. As Sharpe has stated159 : 
Enlargement of standing is an important part of the recognition of the enhanced 
role of the courts brought about by the Charter with all the difficulties this entails. 
Liberalized standing, no longer tied to traditional legal interests, will allow de-
156. Brew on Premise Association of Eastern Ontario v. Ontario, unreported (Ont. Div. Ct., 
March 21, 1994). 
157. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519. 
158. See, eg. the comments of Carthy J.A. in Energy Probe, supra, note 29 at 531 : « Mr. 
Borowski had no direct or future contingent interest in the abortion issue other than as a 
citizen with an interest in constitutional behaviour. Would his status have been differ-
ently considered if he had presented himself in the role of « Borowski Inc. », a non-profit 
organization devoted to issues related to abortion laws ? I think not, and furthermore, if 
in this case it was decided that the individuals have status but the corporations do not, it 
would be a disservice to the purpose of the [public interest] exception in effectively 
bringing significant issues before the court, by depriving one side of the litigation of the 
expertise and resources needed to assure effective presentation. » 
159. R.J. SHARPE, Charter Litigation, Toronto, Butterworths, 1986, p. 25. 
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veloping interests a voice of their own in the discussion about the appropriate 
solution to the problem at hand. Deciding which of these interests should be 
recognized in any particular circumstances will not be easy. What is essential is 
that they not be turned aside only because they appear very different in form and in 
substance from those long cherished by the law. 
While standing is intertwined with the role of Canadian courts and the 
scope of judicial review, the examining of public law in its current social 
context has indeed become a perilously indeterminate exercise. In the 
words of Lamer, C.J.C.160: 
I sometimes think of these sorts of cases as being somewhat like a spider's web. If 
you pull on one strand of the web, the entire structure moves, but not necessarily 
all in the same direction [...] The implications are widespread and, at times, hard to 
foresee. 
Containment of public interest standing, as one of those strands in the web, 
may have considerably unintended social implications. The more daunting 
challenge may be to avoid getting caught in the web and consumed by the 
spider. 
160. Supra, note 154. 
